Abstract
We first introduce the game-theoretic model in section 2.1 with four stages. However, since both players make their choices without any knowledge of previous random choices and choices of the other player, the analysis can later be based on the normal form. In section 2.2 we describe the Bayesian Nash equilibrium points of the normal form game in pure strategies. In section 2.3, finally, we apply elimination of weakly dominated strategies as an alternative theoretical solution concept to Bayesian Nash in pure strategies.
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© 1996 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ryll, W. (1996). The Game-Theoretic Model and Equilibrium Sets. In: Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 440. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-61467-5_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61304-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-61467-5
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