Abstract
This paper gives an exposition of the topological framework for social choice theory developed by Chichilnisky, and reviews the mathematical concepts needed for understanding this framework. Within that context, this paper also discusses some classic results of Chichilnisky.
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References
Chichilnisky G (1979) On fixed point theorems and social choice paradoxes. Econ Lett 3: 347–351
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Chichilnisky G (1983) Social choice and game theory: recent results with a topological approach. In: Pattanaik PK Salles M (eds) Social Choice and Welfare. North-Holland, Amsterdam
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Mehta, P. (1997). Topological methods in social choice: an overview. In: Heal, G.M. (eds) Topological Social Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64599-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60891-9
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