Abstract
This paper studies the topological approach to social choice theory initiated by G. Chichilnisky (1980), extending it to the case of a continuum of agents. The social choice rules are continuous anonymous maps defined on preference spaces which respect unanimity. We establish that a social choice rule exists for a continuum of agents if and only if the space of preferences is contractible. We provide also a topological characterization of such rules as generalized means or mathematical expectations of individual preferences.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg
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Candeal, J.C., Chichilnisky, G., Induráin, E. (1997). Topological aggregation of preferences: the case of a continuum of agents. In: Heal, G.M. (eds) Topological Social Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_12
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64599-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60891-9
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