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Topological Social Choice pp 173–186Cite as

Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population

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Abstract

Abstract. The literature on infinite Chichilnisky rules considers two forms of anonymity: a weak and a strong. This note introduces a third form: bounded anonymity. It allows us to prove an infinite analogue of the “Chichilnisky- Heal-resolution” close to the original theorem: a compact parafinite CW- complex X admits a bounded anonymous infinite rule if and only if X is contractible.

Furthermore, bounded anonymity is shown to be compatible with the finite and the [0, l]-continuum version of anonymity and allows the construction of convex means in infinite populations. With X = [0,1], the set of linear bounded anonymous rules coincides with the set of medial limits.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Monitoraat ETEW, KU Leuven, Dekenstraat 2, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium

    Luc Lauwers

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  1. Luc Lauwers
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Columbia University Columbia Business School, 405 Low Library 535 West 116th. Street, Mail Code 433, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Geoffrey M. Heal

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Lauwers, L. (1997). Topological aggregation, the case of an infinite population. In: Heal, G.M. (eds) Topological Social Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64599-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60891-9

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