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Topological Social Choice pp 157–172Cite as

Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results

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Abstract

We provide a simple construction of social choice rules for economies with infinite populations. The rules are continuous, Pareto and non-dictatorial; they are constructed as limits of individual preferences when the limit exists, and otherwise as adequate generalizations. This contrasts with the impossibility results of Arrow (1951) and Chichilnisky (1980), which are valid on economies with finitely many individuals. Our social choice rules are, however, limits of dictatorial rules. This paper was written in 1979.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Columbia University, 405 Law Memorial Library, New York, NY, 10027, USA

    Graciela Chichilnisky

  2. Program on Information and Resources, Columbia University, 405 Law Memorial Library, New York, NY, 10027, USA

    Geoffrey Heal

Authors
  1. Graciela Chichilnisky
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  2. Geoffrey Heal
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Columbia University Columbia Business School, 405 Low Library 535 West 116th. Street, Mail Code 433, 10027, New York, NY, USA

    Geoffrey M. Heal

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg

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Chichilnisky, G., Heal, G. (1997). Social choice with infinite populations: construction of a rule and impossibility results. In: Heal, G.M. (eds) Topological Social Choice. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60891-9_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64599-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60891-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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