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Reforming the Welfare State pp 25–45Cite as

Moral Hazard in the Welfare State

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Abstract

There is no generally accepted definition of moral hazard. Here I shall refer to certain (but not all) behavioral effects related to provisions in the form of insurance, that is, plans for risk sharing where one party (the insurer) agrees to carry some part or the whole of a loss that the other party (the insured) might face as a result of a specified risk, for example illness. In particular, I shall look at insurance provisions in the welfare state. Sandmo (1991) and Barr (1992), among others, have drawn attention to moral hazard as a potentially large problem in the welfare state.1

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Authors
  1. Lars Söderström
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Düsternbrooker Weg 120, D-24105, Kiel, Germany

    Herbert Giersch (Past President) (Past President)

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Söderström, L. (1997). Moral Hazard in the Welfare State. In: Giersch, H. (eds) Reforming the Welfare State. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64431-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60497-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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