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Unemployment Compensation: Theory and Practice

  • Conference paper
Reforming the Welfare State

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Abstract

In contrast to the “full-employment” optimism which reigned in the industrial world three decades ago, the consensus of economists now appears to be that unemployment is a necessary evil of capitalist economies. Especially evident in the European Union, where unemployment has reached 10% of the labor force, this view has now been exported to Central and Eastern Europe, where previous jobless rates were negligible under communism and have now reached 15% in most countries.1 Mass unemployment carries with it societal stress as well as social exclusion, and this has been nowhere more evident than in the formerly planned economies, where a massive rollback in labor participation risks destroying initial consensus for economic reform.

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Authors
  1. Michael C. Burda
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Kiel Institute of World Economics, Düsternbrooker Weg 120, D-24105, Kiel, Germany

    Herbert Giersch (Past President) (Past President)

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Burda, M.C. (1997). Unemployment Compensation: Theory and Practice. In: Giersch, H. (eds) Reforming the Welfare State. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60497-3_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64431-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60497-3

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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