Abstract
Admissibility is a useful criterion for selecting among equilibria, but I argue that enforcing admissibility dilutes the power of stability criteria to select among equilibrium components, and this accounts for anomalous examples of stable sets. Therefore, admissibility should be invoked only when selecting equilibria within a component that is immune to payoff perturbations.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg
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Wilson, R. (1997). Admissibility and Stability. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_8
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