Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case

Abstract

In his well known series of papers Harsanyi [1967–68] develops the theory of noncooperative games of incomplete information, in which such games are replaced by games of complete information involving chance. He emphasizes the consistent case, in which the various types of players in a game of incomplete information Γ, as generated from the various beliefs, can be thought as being derived from a joint probability matrix. In this case Harsanyi constructs a game G of perfect recall and in extensive form, whose players represent the various types of the players in Γ. They are called agents and G itself is called the agent-form game representing Γ.

I express my gratitude to the Spanish Ministry of Education for a financial support via grant SAB95-0050 DGICYT for the research done while this paper was written. I also want to thank Eric Van Damme whose comment lead to the inclusion of Theorem 4.2.