Abstract
The Paradox of the Absent-Minded Driver is used in the literature to draw attention to the inadequacy of Savage’s theory of subjective probability when its underlying epistomological assumptions fail to be satisfied. This note suggests that the paradox is less telling when the uncertainties involved admit an objective interpretation as frequencies.
Ce que j’ai appris, je ne le sais plus. Le peu que je sais encore, je l’ai deviné. Chamfort, Maximes et Pensées, 1975
Support from the Economic and Social Research Council under their “Beliefs and Behaviour” Programme L 122 251 024 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Binmore, K. (1997). A Note On Imperfect Recall. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_5
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