Abstract
We present the results of an experiment designed to test the proposition that sequencing budget decisions has systematic influence on the size of the budget. The results suggest that individuals vote strategically, leading to the subgame perfect equilibrium of the underlying voting game. The evidence yields no support for the claim that top-down budgeting provides for more fiscal discipline than bottom-up budgeting.
We wish to thank Wulf Albers, Werner Gueth, Ulrich Kamecke, Claudia Keser, Reinhard Selten, Elinor Ostrom, James Walker, and Martin Weber for helpful comments and suggestions. None of the above is responsible for errors that remain. This work is funded by research grants from Indiana University, the University of Mannheim, and the German Science Foundation (DFG).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings and the Congressional Budget Process-An Explanation. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1987.
Crain, W. Mark, and James C. Miller III, “Budget Processes and Spending Growth”. William and Mary Law Review 31, 1993, 1021–46
Davis, Douglas and Charles Holt, Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Eckel, Catherine, and Charles Holt, “Strategic Voting in Agenda-Controlled Experiments”. American Economic Review 79, 1989, 763–73.
Ferejohn, John, and Keith Krehbiel, “The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget,” American Journal of Political Science. 31 (1987), 296–320.
OECD, The Control and Management of Government Expenditure. Paris, 1987.
Rubin, Irene. The Politics of Public Budgeting: Getting and Spending. Borrowing and Balancing. New York: Chatham House, 1993.
Schick, Alan, “Macro-Budgetary Adaptations to Fiscal Stress in Industrialized Democracies”. Public Administration Review 46 (1986), 124–34
Selten, Reinhard, “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfrageträgheit”. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 1965, 301–24
Selten, Reinhard, “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodels mit Nachfrageträgheit”. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 1965, 667–89
Selten, Reinhard, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4, 1975, 25–55.
Selten, Reinhard, “Properties of a Measure of Predictive Success” Mathematical Social Sciences 21. 1991, 153–200
von Hagen, Jürgen, “Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the EC,” European Commission (DG II) Economic Papers 92, 1992.
von Hagen, Jürgen and Ian Harden, “National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance,” European Economy Reports and Studies 3 (1994). 311–418.
Wildavsky, Aaron, Budgeting. Oxford: Transaction Publishers, 1975.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gardner, R.J., von Hagen, J. (1997). Sequencing and the Size of the Budget Experimental Evidence. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_35
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64430-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60495-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive