Abstract
Reinhard Selten has proposed a four-step schema for policy analysis, consisting of (1) focus on a section of reality, (2) formal modelling of that reality, (3) comparison of outcomes under different institutional arrangements, and (4) pursuit of empirical research based on those comparisons. In this paper, we apply Selten’s schema to common-pool resources and the problems that they face. We show how the last decade of research has conformed to Selten’s pattern. In particular, we stress the role field studies and controlled laboratory experiments have played in building behavioral theories for these resources - a role we expect to see expand in the future.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Bester, Helmut, and Werner Güth. 1994. “Is Altruism Evolutionary Stable?” Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
Crawford, Sue E.S., and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 89(3) (Sept.): 582–600.
Dawes, Robyn M. 1973. “The Commons Dilemma Game: An N-person Mixed-Motive Game with a Dominating Strategy for Defection.” Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 13:1–12.
Gardner, Roy. 1995. Games for Business and Economics. New York: John Wiley.
Gardner, Roy, and Elinor Ostrom. 1991. “Rules and Games.” Public Choice 70(2) (May): 121–49.
Gardner, Roy, Elinor Ostrom, and James Walker. 1990. “The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems.” Rationality and Society 2(3) (July): 335–58.
Gibson, Clark, Margaret McKean, and Elinor Ostrom, eds. Forthcoming. Forest Resources and Institutions. Forests, Trees and People Programme, Phase II, Working Paper no. 3. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
Güth, Werner, and Hartmut Kliemt. 1994. “Competition or Co-operation. On the Evolutionary Economics of Trust, Exploitation and Moral Attitudes.” Metroeconomica 45(1394): 155–87.
Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162:1243–48.
Harsanyi, John, and Reinhard Selten. 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lam, Wai Fung. 1994. “Institutions, Engineering Infrastructure, and Performance in the Governance and Management of Irrigation Systems: The Case of Nepal.” Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington.
National Research Council. 1986. Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 1994. “Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6(4) (Oct.): 527–62.
Ostrom, Elinor, Roy Gardner, and James Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, Elinor and James Walker. Forthcoming. “Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas.” In Perspectives on Public Choice, ed. Dennis Mueller. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, Elinor, James Walker, and Roy Gardner. 1992. “Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible.” American Political Science Review 86(2) (June): 404–17.
Rocco, Elena, and Massimo Warglien. 1995. “Computer Mediated Communication and the Emergence of ‘Electronic Opportunism’.” Venice, Italy: University of Venice, Department of Economics, Laboratory of Experimental Economics.
Schlager, Edella. 1990. “Model Specification and Policy Analysis: The Governance of Coastal Fisheries.” Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, Bloomington.
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4:25–55.
Selten, Reinhard. 1978. “The Chain Store Paradox.” Theory and Decision 9:127–59.
Selten, Reinhard. 1986. “Institutional Utilitarianism.” In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector, ed. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Giandomenico Majone, and Vincent Ostrom, 251–64. Berlin: de Gruyter.
Selten, Reinhard. 1991. “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior.” Games and Economic Behavior 3:3–24.
Selten, Reinhard, Michael Mitzkewitz, and Gerald Uhlich. 1988. “Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players.” Discussion Paper no. B-106. Bonn, Germany: University of Bonn.
Stevenson, Glenn G. 1991. Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tang, Shui Yan. 1992. Institutions and Collective Action: Self-Governance in Irrigation. San Francisco, Calif.: ICS Press.
Walker, James, Roy Gardner, Elinor Ostrom, and Andrew Herr. 1995. “Voting on Allocation Rules in a Commons without Face-to-Face Communication: Theoretical Issues and Experimental Results.” Paper to be presented at the conference on “Game Theory and the Behavioral Sciences,” Tucson, Arizona, October 10–12, 1995.
Weissing, Franz J., and Elinor Ostrom. 1991. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement without Guards.” In Game Equilibrium Models II: Methods, Morals, and Markets, ed. Reinhard Selten, 188–262. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Weissing, Franz J., and Elinor Ostrom. 1993. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government- and Farmer-Managed Systems.” In Games in Hierarchies and Networks: Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions, ed. Fritz W. Scharpf, 387–428. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag; Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., Walker, J. (1997). Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_29
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_29
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64430-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60495-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive