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The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games

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Understanding Strategic Interaction

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Abstract

We study here the relation between the consistent solution to large games, and economic equilibria. Using a non-atomic approximation, we show that homogeneous Pareto-optimal allocations are consistent if and only if they correspond to competitive equilibria.

Research supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant No. 9116416

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References

  1. Aumann, R. J., and L. S. Shapley. Values of Non-Atomic Games. Princeton University Press, 1974

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  3. Maschler, M. and G. Owen. “The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments.” In Rational Interaction, ed. R. Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1992, 5–12.

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  4. Owen, G. “The Non-Consistency and Non-Uniqueness of the Consistent Value.” In Essays in Game Theory, ed. N. Megiddo, Springer- Verlag, 1994, 155–162.

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  5. Owen, G. Game Theory. Academic Press, 1995.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 93943, USA

    Guillermo Owen

Authors
  1. Guillermo Owen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Universitätsstraße, Postfach 10 01 31, D - 33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Wulf Albers

  2. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Spandauer Straße 1, D - 10178, Berlin, Germany

    Werner Güth

  3. Abteilung Wickler, Max-Planck-Institut für Verhaltensphysiologie, D - 82319, Seewiesen, Germany

    Peter Hammerstein

  4. Lehrstuhl für VWL, insb. Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Mannheim, Seminargebäude A5, D - 68131, Mannheim, Germany

    Benny Moldovanu

  5. Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, Warandelaan 2, NL-5037 AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Eric van Damme

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg

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Owen, G. (1997). The Consistent Solution for Non-Atomic Games. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_22

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64430-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60495-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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