This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
In Frontiers of Economics, K. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, eds., Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, 28–76.
See Milgrom, P. (1996): Auction Theory for Privatization, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).
Wilson, R. (1992): “Strategic Analysis of Auctions,” in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. I, R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier, 227–279.
“The Value of Information in a Sealed Bid Auction,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1982), 105–114;
Engelbrecht-Wiggins, R., P. Milgrom, and R. Weber: “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 11 (1983), 161–169.
“An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information,” American Economic Review 78 (1988), 865–883.
Gale, D. and L. Shapley (1962): “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.
Roth, A. (1984): “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 92, 991–1016.
See Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor (1990): Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game- Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Roth, A. (1991): “A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom,” American Economic Review 81, 415–440;
Roth, A. and X. Xing (1994): “Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Interactions,” American Economic Review 84, 992–1004.
See, e.g., Debreu, G. and H. Scarf (1963): “A Limit Theorem on the Core of a Market,” International Economic Review 4, 235–246;
Aumann, R. (1964): “Markets with a Continuum of Traders,” Econometrica 32, 39–50;
Aumann, R. and L. Shapley (1974): Values of Non-Atomic Games, Princeton: Princeton University Press
Champsaur, P. (1975): “Cooperation versus Competition,” Journal of Economic Theory 11, 394–417.
Aumann, R. and J. Kruskal (1959): “Assigning Quantitative Values to Qualitative Factors in the Naval Electronics Problem,” Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 6, 1–16.
Hammerstein, P. and S. Riechert (1988): “Payoffs and Strategies in Territorial Contests: ESS Analysis of Two Ecotypes of the Spider Agelenopsis Aperta” Evolutionary Ecology 2, 115–138.
Aumann, R. and M. Maschler (1985): “Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud,” Journal of Economic Theory 36, pp. 195–213.
See, e.g., Kreps, D. and J. Sobel (1994): “Signalling,” in Handbook of Game Theoryj Vol. II, R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier, 849–867.
See, e.g., Kennan, J., and R. Wilson (1993): “Bargaining with Private Information,” Journal of Economic Literature 31, 45–104
Wilson, R. (1994): Negoti ation with Private Information: Litigation and Strikes, Nancy L. Schwartz Lecture, J.L. Kellogg School of Management, Evanston: Northwestern University.
Mertens, J-F. (1989): “Stable Equilibria - A Reformulation, Part I: Definition and Basic Properties,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 14, 575–625
Mertens, J-F. (1989): “Stable Equilibria - A Reformulation, Part II: Discussion of the Definition and Further Results,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 16, 694–753.
Govindan, S. and R. Wilson (1996): “A Sufficient Condition for the Invariance of Essential Components,” Duke Journal of Mathematics, to appear;
Wilson, R. (1992): “Computing Simply Stable Equilibria,” Econometrica, 60, 1039–1070.
Aumann, R. (1987): “Game Theory,” in The New Palgrave, Vol. II, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, eds., London: Macmillan, 460–482. See specifically subsection ii of the section entitled 1970–1986, on page 477, near the bottom of the left column.
Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982), “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367–388. In this experiment, two players were asked to divide a considerable sum (varying as high as DM 100). The procedure was that PI made an offer, which could be either accepted or rejected by P2; if it was rejected, nobody got anything. The players did not know each other and never saw each other; communication was a one-time affair via computer. The only subgame perfect equilibria of this game lead to a split of 99–1 or 100–0. But there are many Nash equilibria, of the form “PI offers x, P2 rejects anything below x.”
“Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study,” American Economic Review 81 (1991), 1068–1095. Roughly speaking, it was found in this experiment that in each of the four different venues, the accepted offers clustered around some specific x, which differed in the different venues.
The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1982.
See, e.g., Ferejohn, J. and J. Kuklinski (eds.) (1990): Information and Democratic Processes, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Roth, A. (1984): “The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 92, 991–1016.
See Roth, A. and M. Sotomayor (1990): Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game- Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society Monograph Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Roth, A. (1991): “A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom,” American Economic Review 81, 415–440;
Roth, A. and X. Xing (1994): “Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Interactions,” American Economic Review 84, 992–1004.
A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995.
Rubinstein, A. (1982): “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50, 97–109.
“Nash Bargaining Theory II,” in The Economics of Bargaining, K.G. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, eds., Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1987, 61–76.
“Values of Markets with Satiation or Fixed Prices,” Econometrica 54 (1986), 1271–1318.
Aumann, R. (1987): “Game Theory,” in The New Palgrave, Vol. II, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, eds., London: Macmillan, 460–482. See specifically subsection ii of the section entitled 1970–1986, on page 477, near the bottom of the left column.
“On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium,” Econometrica 54 (1986), 1003–1034.
“The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica 18 (1950), 155–162.
“Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 13 (1984), 129–144.
“On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium,” Econometrica 54 (1986), 1003–1034.
Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982): “Sequential Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 50, 863–894.
“Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 13 (1984), 129–144.
“Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economies 102 (1987), 179–221.
Spence, A. (1974): Market Signaling. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
“On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium,” Econometrica 54 (1986), 1003–1034.
See, e.g., Kreps, D. and J. Sobel (1994): “Signalling,” in Handbook of Game Theoryj Vol. II, R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds., Amsterdam: Elsevier, 849–867.
Mertens, J-F. (1989): “Stable Equilibria — A Reformulation, Part I: Definition and Basic Properties,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 14, 575–625
Mertens, J-F. (1989): “Stable Equilibria — A Reformulation, Part II: Discussion of the Definition and Further Results,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 16, 694–753.
“Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,” Journal of Mathematical Economics 1 (1974), 67–96.
Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1995), 6–19.
Aumann, R. (1987): “Game Theory,” in The New Palgrave, Vol. II, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, eds., London: Macmillan, 460–482. See specifically subsection ii of the section entitled 1970–1986, on page 477, near the bottom of the left column.
Norde, H., J. Potters, H. Reynierse and D. Vermeiden (1996), “Equilibrium Selection and Consistency,” Games and Economic Behavior 12, 219–225.
Harsanyi, J. and R. Selten (1988): A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
“Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161–1180.
“On the Non-Transferable Value: A Comment on the Roth-Shafer Examples,” Econometrica 53 (1985), 667–677; see specifically Section 8, 674–675.
Güth, W., and H. Kliemt “On the Justification of Strategic Equilibrium — Rationality Requirements Versus Conceivable Adaptive Processes,” DP 46, Economics Series, Humboldt University, Berlin, 1995.
Unpublished. See also Schanuel, S.H., L.K. Simon, and W.R. Zame (1991), “The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure,” in Reinhard Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models II, Berlin: Springer.
The Selfish Gene, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.
In Economic Analysis of Markets and Games, Essays in Honor of Frank Hahn, P. Dasgupta, D. Gale, O. Hart and E. Maskin, eds., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, 214–227.
Games and Economic Behavior 7 (1995), 6–19.
“A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 84 (1980), 93–101;
“Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games,” Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS) 5 (1983), 269–363 (see also “Correction and Further Development,” MSS 16 (1988), 223–266).
Maynard Smith, J. (1982): Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Selten, R. (1964): “Valuation of n-Person Games,” in Advances in Garne Theory, Annals of Mathematics Study 52, R.D. Luce, L.S. Shapley and A.W. Tucker, eds., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 577–627.
Harsanyi, J. (1963): “A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game,” International Economic Review, 4, 194–220.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (1997). On the State of the Art in Game Theory: An Interview with Robert Aumann. In: Albers, W., Güth, W., Hammerstein, P., Moldovanu, B., van Damme, E. (eds) Understanding Strategic Interaction. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60495-9_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64430-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60495-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive