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Abstract

In this chapter the existence of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium point in the multiproduct oligopoly game will be first investigated. Then on the basis of the general results special cases will be examined. These include models with product differentiation and the classical Cournot model. In the second part of this chapter modified oligopoly models such as rent seeking games, labor-managed oligopolies, and oligopsonies will be discussed.

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg

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Okuguchi, K., Szidarovszky, F. (1999). Existence and Uniqueness Results. In: The Theory of Oligopoly with Multi-Product Firms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60169-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60169-9_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64287-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-60169-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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