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Zusammenfassung

Ziel war die Begriindung der Optimalitiit des Einsatzes von Beteiligungs- und (risikobehafteten) Forderungstiteln rum Zweck der Untemehmensfmanzierung im Rahmen eines agency-theoretischen Ansatzes mit risikoneutralen Entscheidungssubjekten und beschriinkter Haftung aller Beteiligten. Konkret sollten Bedingungen hergeleitet werden, unter denen sich der simultane Einsatz von extemer Eigen- und Fremdfinanzierung als einzig optimale Verhaltensweise ergab. Dazu wurden neben detaillierten Steuerungsmoglichkeiten seitens des Untemehmers Kosten bei der Schaffung von Finanzierungstiteln sowie bei der Informationsiibermittlung vom Untemehmer an Exteme unterstellt.

This paper aims to bring to attention special aspects of corporate governance in banking. In so doing it points out that banking differs in significant ways from industrial activities in terms of the nature of the business and context. Regarding the first, it is stressed that the core business of loan granting requires a much more careful customer selection. In terms of context, it is pointed out that long-term relationships are common and that banks are under special supervision. The mentioned characteristics have some important implications for corporate governance. First, the delegation of credit decisions may have unfortunate effects on the control exercised by the board, while board members still have full responsibility. Second, the need to protect business secrets may restrict the material provided for decisions. Third, customer representation on boards may lead to boards that are too large and to conflicts-of-interest. Fourth, the special supervision may give bank board members a false feeling of certainty. In conclusion the paper suggests solutions to the mentioned problems.

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Breuer, W. (1999). Finanzierung. In: Albach, H., Eymann, E., Luhmer, A., Steven, M. (eds) Die Theorie der Unternehmung in Forschung und Praxis. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60067-8_11

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