Abstract
Traffic systems in large cities might be viewed as interdependent decision situations. Natural N-person extensions of familiar games may serve as templates to cover some system relations. An agent based simulation model is proposed. Several decision levels are considered in the model in order to cover aspects of institutional framework.
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References
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Berkemer, R. (2000). Modal Split and Social Dilemmas. In: Helbing, D., Herrmann, H.J., Schreckenberg, M., Wolf, D.E. (eds) Traffic and Granular Flow ’99. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59751-0_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59751-0_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-64109-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-59751-0
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