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Where do we Stand in the Theory of Finance? A Selective Overview with Reference to Erich Gutenberg

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Germany

    J. P. Krahnen (Professor of Finance, Director, Research Fellow)

  2. CFS Center for Financial Studies, Frankfurt, Germany

    J. P. Krahnen (Professor of Finance, Director, Research Fellow)

  3. CEPR Centre for European Policy Research, London, UK

    J. P. Krahnen (Professor of Finance, Director, Research Fellow)

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Krahnen, J.P. (2000). Where do we Stand in the Theory of Finance? A Selective Overview with Reference to Erich Gutenberg. In: Theory of the Firm. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59661-2_7

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