Abstract
In this chapter, we present a descriptive model which characterizes experimental subjects’ behavior when they play the announcement mechanism. The observation of experimental data and, particularly, some regularities in the deviation of data on average from theoretical predictions suggest that there is a possible explanation of aggregated data. We have observed that players are divided into two groups: players who cheat and players who do not cheat (see Subsection 2.5.2). Moreover, the average values from which players start to cheat are very close for the three different positions (81.7, 81.2 and 80.5). We will say that a value is low when it is strictly lower than 81, and high when it is equal to or higher than 81. As we have seen in Subsection 2.5.2, players who cheat do not do so according to the theoretical prediction. There, we have proposed a simple model that describes how players who cheat announce their values. Our aim, in this section, is to present a more general model, which assigns the conditional probability that a player cheats when he announces in the different positions, given his value and the others’ announcements. To estimate these probabilities, we use a logit model. After having estimated the probability that a player cheats when he announces in one of the three positions (Section 3.1), we show how the descriptive model works (Section 3.2). We simulate players’ behavior in our descriptive model, and we compare the simulated players’ behavior with experimental subjects behavior.
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Notes
The adjective logit is due to the relation of this transformation with the logistic function (see Theil (1971)).
Note that we are disregarding the units problem.
Actually, this happened for a player who announced as the third one (see Table 3.5).
We use the estimated values of β31 and β32 given in Table 2.9.
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© 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Artale, A. (1997). A Descriptive Model. In: Rings in Auctions. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 447. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-61930-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-59158-7
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