The analysis of the Lower Seyhan Irrigation Project has aimed to reveal why effective means for controlling high groundwater levels, waterlogging and salinization have been ignored by the participants, and why they have participated in activities which have produced high groundwater levels and salinization. The basic assumption leading the analysis has been that the incentives facing the selfinterested individuals, be they politicial, bureaucratic, civil or economic agents, have biased towards the control of high groundwater levels and salinization. The task of the case study was to prove whether the Institutional Rational Choice approach can be applied for the analysis of the environmental problem in a largescale public irrigation scheme. This approach makes the general assumption that institutions, or rules-in-use, decisively influence the individuals’ decisions and the respective outcomes; the participants would behave rationally within a given institutional setting, and the rules would provide (dys)functional incentives for the participants involved.
KeywordsState Agency Water User Drainage Network Water Charge Capital Charge
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