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The Simplified Alternating Double Auction Market - A Game Theoretic Analysis

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The Alternating Double Auction Market

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ((LNE,volume 466))

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Abstract

Assume the demand and supply curves in an alternating double auction market are normal, i.e. a monotonically falling demand and a monotonically rising supply curve. Classical market analysis assumes all trades will occur at the market clearing price p*, which lies on the intersection of the demand and supply curves. However, since we have a finite number of players and all values are integers, the intersection of the demand and supply curves must not necessarily be a point. Thus, a range of prices can exist (a market clearing price range), in which classical market analysis would expect the competitive equilibrium.

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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Sadrieh, A. (1998). The Simplified Alternating Double Auction Market - A Game Theoretic Analysis. In: The Alternating Double Auction Market. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 466. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58953-9_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58953-9_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-64895-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-58953-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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