Abstract
The focal point of the work presented here was the development of a conceptual framework which allows the consistent integration of information in a model of general equilibrium. Further, it was the analysis whether and under which conditions the core of economies with asymmetric information is nonempty. Using the concept of the core as equilibrium concept, some ideas from contract theory, a partial equilibrium framework -i.e. the conclusion of binding agreements between economic subjects - can be transfered to a model of an economy. However, the models presented here just a first step to analyze the impact of informational problems of an economy and can be extended in several respects. Some of these extensions are sketched in the following. First, it is the integration of strategic information transmission, the modeling of Walras equilibria with asymmetric information and its relationship to the core, and the problem of stable firm structures, an concept developed independently by Böhm (1973) and Sondermann (1974).
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Schwalbe, U. (1999). Conclusion. In: The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 474. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58477-0_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58477-0_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-66028-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-58477-0
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