Abstract
The model of an exchange economy with asymmetric information as developed in this chapter differs from the approaches discussed so far in two important respects: The modeling of information and the definition of feasible allocations. Information is considered as a constituent part of an economy and not just as a restriction on the possible consumption plans as usually done in the literature. This allows for taking into account both aspects of information simultaneously, as mentioned in the introduction: Information as a commodity and information as a characteristic of an agent. Modeling information in this way is analogous to the treatment of uncertainty in models of general equilibrium, as e.g. Debreu (1953). He suggested to define commodities not only with respect to physical properties, time and place but also with respect to the state of nature in which the commodities are available. The definition employed here extends this approach by differentiating commodities with respect to information.
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Notes
The assumption of the finiteness of Ω is not necessary but facilitates the mathematics without reducing the economic content of the model.
see Debreu (1953), p.120.
For the results, the assumption of e i being compatible with is not necessary. It turns out that the measurability of the net trade x — e i is sufficient.
Here denotes the cardinality of a set.
see Akerl of (1970).
Krasa and Yannelis call this weakly coalitional incentive compatible.
In the present context, an assumption equivalent to that of Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1995) would be that agents can observe only the state contingent part of an allocation, but not the information itself.
One could ask the question why Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1995) assume that agents don’t observe the initial endowments and arrive at the full information core immediately since a vector of initial endowments is an allocation as any other.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Schwalbe, U. (1999). Exchange Economies. In: The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 474. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58477-0_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58477-0_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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