Summary
The application of the European Community directives regarding the rail sector involves the separation between network management and transport service provision and calls for the definition of a track access mechanism.
We propose a game-theoretic model where the transport operators (TOs) request tracks to the infrastructure company (IC) and set prices for the transport services they offer with the aim of maximizing their profit, considering demand data obtained by aggregating individual customers’ preferences.
The IC allocates the tracks among the TOs and determines tariffs for infrastructure use through an allocation and pricing mechanism that keeps into account the competitive nature of the emerging organizational structure of the rail industry.
The mechanism is inherently non-discriminatory, since the IC maximizes the value of the schedule of each TO on the basis of the requested tracks and the associated weights.
Finally, the model enables the IC to choose among different solutions according to overall policy criteria.
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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bassanini, A., Nastasi, A. (1999). Pricing and Allocation of Rail Track Capacity. In: Kall, P., Lüthi, HJ. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 1998. Operations Research Proceedings 1998, vol 1998. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_49
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_49
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