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Membership of Values to the Core for Average-Convex TU-Games

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Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings 1998 ((ORP,volume 1998))

Summary

The paper provides an alternative, but direct proof of the known fact that the Shapley value of every average-convex transferable utility game is included in the core. The study about the membership to the core is extended to the class of efficient, linear and symmetric values for TU-games. For such a value, a recursive formula is presented and used as a basic tool to establish the membership of the value to the core whenever the game satisfies an extended version of average-convexity.

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References

  1. Driessen T.S.H., Radzik T., and R.G. Wanink, (1996), Potential and consistency: a uniformapproach to values for TU-games. Memorandum No. 1323, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands.

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  5. Sprumont Y. (1990). Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility. Games and Economic Behavior 2, pp. 378–394.

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Correspondence to Theo S. H. Driessen .

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Driessen, T.S.H. (1999). Membership of Values to the Core for Average-Convex TU-Games. In: Kall, P., Lüthi, HJ. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 1998. Operations Research Proceedings 1998, vol 1998. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65381-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-58409-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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