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Oligopolies as Dynamic Games: A Computational Economics Perspective

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Part of the book series: Operations Research Proceedings 1998 ((ORP,volume 1998))

Summary

The purpose of this paper is to report on some experiments concerning the numerical solutions of a class of dynamic Cournot models. In doing so we shall put in evidence the importance of the assumption of strict diagonal concavity of the payoff functions in the numerical analysis of dynamical imperfect competition models.

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© 1999 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Haurie, A., Moresino, F. (1999). Oligopolies as Dynamic Games: A Computational Economics Perspective. In: Kall, P., Lüthi, HJ. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 1998. Operations Research Proceedings 1998, vol 1998. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58409-1_3

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-65381-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-58409-1

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