Abstract
The idea behind the Nash program is to achieve a cooperative outcome via strategic interaction. The task is to design a non-cooperative game such that the (cooperative) payoff vector appears as an equilibrium-payoff of the game. So the cooperative solution can be supported by an equilibrium of an appropriate non-cooperative game. One motivation why it might be useful to have such support results for cooperative solutions was given by Nash (1953): “… two approaches to the problem, via the negotiation or via the axioms [which] are complementary; each helps to clarify and justify the other.”
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Haake, CJ. (2000). Support and Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution. In: Inderfurth, K., Schwödiauer, G., Domschke, W., Juhnke, F., Kleinschmidt, P., Wäscher, G. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 1999. Operations Research Proceedings 1999, vol 1999. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58300-1_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58300-1_29
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