Abstract
In this chapter, games with control costs* are studied. These are normal form games in which each player, in addition to receiving his payoff from the game, incurs costs depending on how well he chooses to control his actions. Such a game models the idea that a player can reduce the probability of making mistakes, but that he can only do so by being extra prudent, hence, by spending an extra effort, which involves some costs.1 The goal of the chapter is to investigate what the consequences are of viewing an ordinary normal form game as a limiting case of a game with control costs, i.e. it is examined which equilibria are still viable when infinitesimal control costs are incorporated into the analysis of normal form games.2
The idea to study games was raised by R. Selten.
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Notes
In Stahl [1990a] an alternative way of introducing control costs is proposed and analyzed. In Stahl’s model a player plays all pure strategies with the same probability if he doesn’t exert any effort. If a player wants to play a different strategy he incurs control costs that depend on the entropy reduction that he wants to obtain. Another model in which a player has to choose both target strategies and ‘desired’ error probabilities is described in Beja [1990].
There is a close relation between the theory developed in this chapter and the theory of boundedly rational behavior developed in Rosenthal [1989].
Some of the statements in Harsanyi [1975] concerning the properties of the tracing procedure are imprecise. For further details and mathematically correct formulations, see Schanuel, Simon and Zame [1991].
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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van Damme, E. (1991). 4 Control Costs. In: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-53800-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-58242-4
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