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Financial Risk, Financial Intermediaries and Game Theory

  • Flavio Pressacco

Abstract

Financial intermediaries exist and were already studied well before the second half of our twentieth century. Yet in the last fifty years many new and more precise insights on financial institutions have been derived exploiting results obtained by researchers of the scientific area defined (more or less precisely) as modern-quantitative finance.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Financial Risk Contingent Claim Financial Intermediary 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Flavio Pressacco
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di finanza dell’impresa e dei mercati finanziari. UniversitàUdineItaly

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