Abstract
This article analyzes the internal workings of the European Parliament (EP). Particularly, it addresses the question, can the EP overcome internal decision-making problems and play the role of “conditional agenda-setter” specified by the cooperation procedure of the European Union? According to this procedure, the EP can make a proposal that, if accepted by the European Commission, is easier for the European Council to accept than to modify. Elsewhere I have argued that this procedure places significant decisionmaking powers in the hands of the EP. However, I had assumed the EP to be a unitary actor. In this article I relax the unitary-actor assumption and examine the possibilities generated at both the theoretical and the empirical levels by an EP composed of 518 members (or 567 because of German reunification or 639 European Union expansion), organized in specialized standing committees, with rapporteurs responsible for the proposal of parliamentary amendments to European legislation. The conclusion of this analysis is that the internal organization of the EP enables it to play the role of a conditional agenda-setter, that is, the conclusions concerning the power attributed by the cooperation procedure to the EP hold for the actual EP, not merely for an idealized unitary actor.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Banks, J. S. “Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and the Covering Relation.” Social Choice and Welfare 1985, 1: 295–306.
Bogdanor, Vemon. “The June 1989 European Elections and the Institutions of the Community.” Government and Opposition 1989, 24: 199–214.
Bowler, Shaun, and Farrell, David M. “Legislator Shirking and Voter Monitoring Impacts of European Parliament Electoral Systems Upon Legislator/Voter Relationships.” Journal of Common Market Studies 1993, 1: 45–68
Bowler, Shaun, and Farrell, David M. “The Organization of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialization, and Coordination.” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
Dehousse, R. “1992 and Beyond: The Institutional Dimension of the Internal Market Programme.” Legal Issues of European Integration 1989: 109–136.
Edward, David. “The Impact of the Single Act on the Institutions.” Common Market Law Review 1987, 24: 19–30.
“Europe’s Feeble Parliament.” Economist January 22, 1994, 15.
Ferejohn, John A, McKelvey, Richard D., and Packell, Edward W. “Limiting Distributions for Continuous State Markov Voting Models.” Social Choice and Welfare 1984, 1: 45–67.
Fitzmaurice, John. “An Analysis of the European Community’s Co-operation Procedure.” Journal of Common Market Studies 1988, 4: 389–400.
Garrett, Geoffrey. “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal Market.” International Organization 1992, 46: 533–560.
Jacobs, Francis, Corbett, Richard, and Shackleton, Michael. The European Parliament (2nd ed.). Essex, England: Longman, 1993.
Lenaerts, Koen. “Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the European Community.” Common Market Law Review 1991, 28: 11–35.
Lodge, Juliet. “The European Parliament—From ‘Assembly’ to Co-legislature: Changing the Institutional Dynamics.” In Lodge, J. (ed.), The European Community and the Challenge of the Future. London: Pinter, 1989.
McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Model and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 1976, 12: 472–482.
Miller, Nicholas R. “A New’ solution Set’ for Tournaments and Majority Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 1980, 24: 68–96.
Miller, Nicholas R., Grofman, Bernard, and Feld, Scott L. “The Geometry of Majority Rule.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 1989, 4: 379–406.
Ordeshook, Peter C., and Schwartz, Thomas. “Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes.” American Political Science Review 1987, 81: 179–200.
Putnam, Robert D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization 1988, 42: 427–460.
Schwartz, Thomas. “Cyclic Tournaments and Cooperative Majority Voting: A Solution.” Social Choice and Welfare 1990, 7: 19–29.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 1979, 23: 27–57.
Thomas, H. G. “Democracy and 1992-Integration Without Accountability?” The Liverpool Law Review 1988, 10: 185–201.
Tsebelis, George. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
Tsebelis, George. “The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter.” American Political Science Review 1994, 88: 128–142.
Tsebelis, George. “Conditional Agenda Setting and Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament.” Journal of Legislative Studies (forthcoming).
Tsebelis, George. “Will Maastricht Reduce the ‘Democratic Deficit?’” Unpublished manuscript (no date).
Tsebelis, George, and Money, Jeannette. “Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France.” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).
Weber, Shlomo, and Wiesmeth, Hans. “Issue Linkage in the European Community.” Journal of Common Market Studies 1991, 29: 255–267.
Wessels, Wolfgang. “The EC Council: The Community’s Decisionmaking Center.” In Keohane, Robert, and Hoffman, Stanley (eds.), The New European Community. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
Williams, Shirley. “Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community.” In Keohane, Robert, and Hoffman, Stanley (eds.), The New European Community. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament. In: Eichengreen, B., Frieden, J., von Hagen, J. (eds) Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe. European and Transatlantic Studies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57811-3_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57811-3_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-63363-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57811-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive