Abstract
The present chapter re-examines the Bond and Chen (1987) model on illegal immigration, introducing a government budget constraint (GBC) on the host country’s government. It examines the effect of financing internal enforcement of illegal immigration by the host-country’s government on the welfare of the host (labor-importing) country, the foreign (labor-exporting)country and the world, both in the absence and in the presence of international capital mobility. The aim of this chapter is to determine whether the internal inforcement may be a Pareto-improving policy
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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Yoshida, C. (2000). The Welfare Effects of Financing the Internal Enforcement of Illegal Immigration. In: Illegal Immigration and Economic Welfare. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57693-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57693-5_6
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1315-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57693-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive