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Political and Economic Scope for Permit Markets in Europe

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Flexible Mechanisms for an Efficient Climate Policy

Part of the book series: ZEW Economic Studies ((ZEW,volume 11))

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Abstract

What kind of design allows society to achieve environmental objectives cost-effectively? In general, economists have not considered political concerns and second-best world solutions in the traditional analysis of economic instruments. The contribution here is to find a cost-effective approach to environmental regulation in Europe and thereby diminish the gap between theory and practice. If a policy is not designed in a politically acceptable way, it will inevitably be changed away from its cost-effective design during the political decision-making process because none of the dominating interest groups like it. There must be something in it for them.

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© 2000 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Svendsen, G.T. (2000). Political and Economic Scope for Permit Markets in Europe. In: Brockmann, K.L., Stronzik, M. (eds) Flexible Mechanisms for an Efficient Climate Policy. ZEW Economic Studies, vol 11. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57691-1_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57691-1_9

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1314-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57691-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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