Abstract
Environmental planning and cost-benefit modeling in crime control shows some striking analogies. The purpose of this note is to exploit this fact in an intertemporal framework. In particular, the optimal mix of ‘prevention’ and ‘treatment’ in pollution control and illicit drug consumption is illustrated by several optimal control and dynamic game models.
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Feichtinger, G. (2001). Environmental Policy Design and the Economics of Crime: Some Analogies in Intertemporal Optimization. In: Kischka, P., Möhring, R.H., Leopold-Wildburger, U., Radermacher, FJ. (eds) Models, Methods and Decision Support for Management. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57603-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57603-4_2
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