Abstract
More and more, game theory is becoming the basic tool of economic theory, and it is increasingly found useful in other disciplines such as philosophy, political science, computer science, and even formal logic.
This paper was written while I was visiting the Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI) at Stanford University.
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Vilks, A. (2001). What is a Game?. In: Bolle, F., Carlberg, M. (eds) Advances in Behavioral Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57571-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57571-6_7
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