Summary
In this investigation we analyze networks from an economic point of view. Incentive problems arise in networks which are characterized by an asymmetry of information between opportunistic actors with different objectives. In a network which consists of forwarding agents and carriers we focus on the contractual principal-agent relationships. Thinking about new information technologies one central question arises: Can new information technologies be used to reduce the asymmetry of information and to produce a better payoff for the economic actors in the network? One important result is that contracts can generally be improved if new information technologies, e. g. a tracking and tracing system or an electronic coordination system, are used to obtain additional valuable information.
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© 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Bölsche, D., Becker, C. (2002). Contracts and eContracting: The Case of Forwarding Agents and Carriers. In: Geihs, K., König, W., von Westarp, F. (eds) Networks. Information Age Economy. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57476-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57476-4_7
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1449-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57476-4
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