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Negotiation Rules and Bargaining Behavior

What Is Known and What Needs to Be Further Explored?

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Book cover Surveys in Experimental Economics

Part of the book series: Contributions to Economics ((CE))

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Abstract

Our programmatic review discusses the empirical support of the normative theory of bargaining which is an application of (non-) cooperative game theory and whose predictions depend more or less crucially on the specific rules of bargaining. Unfortunately, little is known about the rules of bargaining, i.e. there is a lack of empirical research concerning this type of institutional economics. An interesting, but hardly satisfactory alternative to such empirical research, namely to derive the rules of bargaining, is illustrated with a help of a simple example. From empirical, mostly experimental results we draw some general conclusions how one might proceed when developing the behavioral theory of bargaining.

This study has been inspired by Wulf Gartner whose encouragement is gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors
  1. Werner Güth
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Lehrstuhl VWL, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie, Europa-Universität Viadrina, Große Scharrnstraße 59, Frankfurt/Oder, D-15230, Germany

    Friedel Bolle

  2. Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaften Managerial Economics, Technische Universität Dresden, Mommsenstraße 13, Dresden, D-01062

    Marco Lehmann-Waffenschmidt

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Güth, W. (2002). Negotiation Rules and Bargaining Behavior. In: Bolle, F., Lehmann-Waffenschmidt, M. (eds) Surveys in Experimental Economics. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57458-0_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57458-0_2

  • Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1472-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57458-0

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