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Literaturverzeichnis

  • Dorothea Schäfer
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Part of the Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge book series (WIRTSCH.BEITR., volume 190)

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Literaturverzeichnis

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Authors and Affiliations

  • Dorothea Schäfer
    • 1
  1. 1.Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)Berlin

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