Abstract
The highest transaction efficiency and average payoff could be found in T2. The differences in transaction efficiency between T2 and T4 were highly significant. Average payoffs could be found significantly lower in treatments where subjects knew their distribution (differences depend on the value section considered). Differences in bidding behavior also existed. Bidding behavior was investigated using bid-to-value ratios, which directly indicate whether subjects bid, on average, their value or less or more than their value. T2 is prominent again. First, T2 is the only treatment where subjects bid remarkably above their value in the low value section. Second, the mean bid-to-value ratio for high values is 1, which could be taken as indication for truthtelling. However, this is just an effect of averaging out. Comparing bid-to-value ratios of different treatments, significant differences between T2 and T4 were detected for high values: T4-subjects submitted significantly lower bids than T2-subjects. In both treatments T3 and T4, different distributions of subjects (D1-D6) respond to different degrees of competition for complementary orders. Intuitive bidding (according to B50 , BT , and B lOO ) was also considered and found to playa small but noticeable role: at least 8% of all T2-subjects submitted more than 90% of their bids accordingly. lead to significantly different bid-to-value ratios. This evidences that subjects respond to different degrees of competition for complementary orders. Intuitive bidding (according to B 50, B T, and B 100) was also considered and found to playa small but noticeable role: at least 8& of all T2-subjects submitted more than 90% of their bids accordingly.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ihde, T. (2004). Experiment. In: Dynamic Alliance Auctions. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57430-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57430-6_8
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0098-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57430-6
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