Abstract
This chapter investigates the performance of Dynamic Alliance auctions. First, appropriate performance criteria are introduced in Section 7.1 and a modified private value framework is given in Section 7.2. Sections 7.3, 7.4, and 7.5 explore Dynamic Alliance auctions alongside this framework. Section 7.3 treats two special cases and shows that Nash equilibria with plausible outcomes do exist for them. Afterwards, Section 7.4 develops a formal representation of shippers' expected payoffs, which is used in Section 7.5 in order to demonstrate that the special case equilibria do not hold for arbitrary markets. Intuitive bidding strategies are also offered in Section 7.5.
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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Ihde, T. (2004). Efficiency, Payoff, and Bids. In: Dynamic Alliance Auctions. Contributions to Management Science. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57430-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57430-6_7
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-0098-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57430-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive