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Gefängnis, Therapie und Bewährung: Eine ökonomische Analyse

  • Volker Meier
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Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag untersucht die Wahl von Sanktionsniveaus, wobei Gefängnis und Therapie die beiden Behandlungsarten des Straftäters darstellen. Eine Kombination beider Arten wird nie gewählt. Die Behandlungslänge geht zurück, wenn ihr Preis steigt oder die erwarteten Kosten eines Rückfalls sinken. An Stellen des Behandlungsartwechsels werden Kriminelle in der Regel früher entlassen, wenn sie therapiert werden. Jüngere Täter besitzen eine höhere Chance, eine therapeutische Behandlung zu erhalten. Die Auswirkungen der Änderungen anderer Parameter auf die Wahl zwischen Gefängnis und Therapie sind uneindeutig.

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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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  • Volker Meier

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