Abstract
In this book I have attempted to contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon of strategic delegation, with particular reference to the organisation of firms and of the trade union, and to its welfare implications. I have discussed how different market and non-market relations involving delegates connect to each other. In chapters 2 and 3 I have considered how the need to delegate decisions concerning the product market to managers, and to compensate them through incentive contracts, modifies firms’ strategy space and allows them to attain equilibria that are different from the one which would have been reached were the owners directly playing the product market game.
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Merzoni, G.S. (2003). Conclusions. In: Strategic Delegation in Firms and in the Trade Union. Contributions to Economics. Physica, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57332-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57332-3_6
Publisher Name: Physica, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-7908-1432-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-57332-3
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