Abstract
A framework is presented for optimal control in a dynamic game of value-cost interaction, with multiple players allocating costs to pursues objectives. For each time step, the stability of the interaction matrix in the equilibrium can be controlled by the cost allocation, leading to a cost-minimal coalition. In the repeated game the players can mutually adjust their costs non-cooperatively according to reaction functions. Cooperative control of cost allocation can help to stabilize the dynamics and achieve an optimal tradeoff between costs and objectives.
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Scheffran, J. (2001). Stability and Optimal Control of a Multiplayer Dynamic Game. In: Fleischmann, B., Lasch, R., Derigs, U., Domschke, W., Rieder, U. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings. Operations Research Proceedings, vol 2000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56656-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56656-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-41587-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-56656-1
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