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On the Evolution of Power Indices in Collective Bargaining

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Zusammenfassung

Starting point of our (indirect) evolutionary analysis is the sequential bargaining model of Manning (1987) who distinguishes between trade union’s power in initial wage and in later employment negotiations. By linking two such collective bargaining situations we can say which of the two (two-dimensional) power constellations is better and thereby derive the power structure endogenously. By distinguishing various measures of (evolutionary or reproductive) success we can identify the forces shaping the relative power indices of trade unions.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, Zirkel 2, D — 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Siegfried Berninghaus

  2. Department of Economics, Institute for Economic Theory III, Humboldt-University of Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, D-10178, Berlin, Germany

    Werner Güth

Authors
  1. Siegfried Berninghaus
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  2. Werner Güth
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut f. Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Zirkel 2, Rechenzentrum, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Siegfried K. Berninghaus (Professor Dr.) (Professor Dr.)

  2. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften VWL/Außenwirtschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Rolandstr. 8, 49069, Osnabrück, Germany

    Michael Braulke (Professor Dr.) (Professor Dr.)

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© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Berninghaus, S., Güth, W. (2001). On the Evolution of Power Indices in Collective Bargaining. In: Berninghaus, S.K., Braulke, M. (eds) Beiträge zur Mikro- und zur Makroökonomik. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56606-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56606-6_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-62679-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-56606-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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