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Makroökonomik aus institutionenökonomischer Sicht

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Beiträge zur Mikro- und zur Makroökonomik

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Zusammenfassung

Sowohl Keynesianer als auch moderne Institutionenökonomen kritisieren die „Klassischen Ökonomen“. Sie benutzen dabei ähnliche Mikrobegründungen des Geschäftsverhaltens (der „institutionellen Arrangements“) der einzelnen. Jedoch: im Unterschied zu den Keynesianern beziehen die Vertreter der modernen Institutionenökonomik den institutionellen Rahmen in ihre Analyse mit ein. Der Zusammenhang zwischen „Wirtschaft und Politik“ ist für sie ebenfalls Gegenstand der ökonomischen Analyse. Das ist insbesondere der zentrale Gegenstand der „Neuen Politischen Ökonomik“. Das Konzept der „Institution-als-Gleichgewichteines-Spiels“ wird in dieser Literatur angewendet — ein Ansatz, der zu multiplen Gleichgewichten führt. Das Keynessche Unterbeschäftigungsgleichgewicht kann so interpretiert werden. Der Beitrag plädiert dafür, die Makroanalyse und die „Neue Politische Ökonomik“ um das von Wirtschaftshistorikern erfolgreich erprobte Verfahren der „analytischen Narration“ zu erweitern.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. em. o. Professor der Universität des Saarlandes, Germany

    Rudolf Richter

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  1. Rudolf Richter
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institut f. Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Karlsruhe, Zirkel 2, Rechenzentrum, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany

    Siegfried K. Berninghaus (Professor Dr.) (Professor Dr.)

  2. Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften VWL/Außenwirtschaft, Universität Osnabrück, Rolandstr. 8, 49069, Osnabrück, Germany

    Michael Braulke (Professor Dr.) (Professor Dr.)

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Richter, R. (2001). Makroökonomik aus institutionenökonomischer Sicht. In: Berninghaus, S.K., Braulke, M. (eds) Beiträge zur Mikro- und zur Makroökonomik. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56606-6_30

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56606-6_30

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-62679-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-56606-6

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