Zusammenfassung
Was ist eine „Firma“? Was ist unter dem Begriff „Markt“ zu verstehen? Warum sind manche erfolgreiche Firmen sehr gross, andere wiederum extrem klein? Wie sollte eine Firma organisatorisch strukturiert sein? Wie lassen sich verschiedene Organisationsstrukturen erklären? Welche Anreizprobleme existieren innerhalb von Firmen? Wie lassen sich diese lösen? Welche Rolle spielt in diesem Zusammenhang die Zuordnung der Eigentumsrechte?
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Bühler, S., Jaeger, F. (2002). Elemente einer Theorie der Firma. In: Einführung in die Industrieökonomik. Springer-Lehrbuch. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56065-1_2
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