Abstract
The model-theoretic literature on corruption typically focuses on its consequences, e.g. on output as in Ehrlich and Lui (1999), or on government policy as in Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). By contrast, this paper offers a new approach by incorporating the political power structure in the analysis.
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References
Acemoglu D, Verdier T (2000) The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption. American Economic Review 90: 194–211
Dabla-Norris E (2000) A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies., IMF Working Paper WP/00/106
Ehrlich I, Lui FT (1999) Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth. Journal of Political Economy 107: 270–293
Tanzi V, Daroodi H (1997) Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. IMF Working Paper WP/97/139
Thiele H, Eskeland GS (1999) Optimal Corruption and Moral Hazard. Presentation at the Econometric Society European Meeting 1999
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Bohn, F. (2003). Powerful Groups and Corruption. In: Lane, T., Oding, N., Welfens, P.J.J. (eds) Real and Financial Economic Dynamics in Russia and Eastern Europe. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55512-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55512-1_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-62467-4
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