Abstract
In an experiment on coordination games, Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2001) test the predictions of global games theory concerning agents’ behavior. Their experimental test design mimics the model of speculative attacks by Morris and Shin (1998). In order to find out whether agents’ behavior changes due to the type of information they possess, they analyze artificial currency crisis situations once with private information, once with public information. In particular, they test the hypothesis that players coordinate on the strate-gies predicted by global games theory against alternative hypotheses, which propose the use of payoff dominant strategies, maximin strategies or so-called Laplacian strategies. In the following, we will briefly describe the structural design of their experiment and discuss the results.
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© 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Metz, C.E. (2003). Experimental Evidence. In: Information Dissemination in Currency Crises. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 527. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55471-1_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55471-1_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-00656-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-55471-1
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