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Applying the Theory of Contestation: Three Sectors of Global Governance

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A Theory of Contestation

Part of the book series: SpringerBriefs in Political Science ((BRIEFSPOLITICAL))

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Abstract

To illustrate the potential value-added of the theory of contestation for research on global governance, this chapter turns to three explorative cases in which the relation between types of norms is presented through sector-specific narratives. The cases and the respective selection of norms that play a role at the three stages of norm implementation include security governance (e.g. civilian inviolability, responsibility to protect, non-intervention), climate governance (e.g. sustainability, common but differentiated responsibility, emissions standards) and fisheries governance (e.g. sustainable fisheries, precautionary principle, fishing quotas).

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to the Canadian governance, the approach is define thus: “An ecosystem approach requires that fisheries management decisions consider the impact of the fishery not only on the target species, but also on non-target species, seafloor habitats, and the ecosystems of which these species are a part. This approach also requires that management decisions take into account changes in the ecosystem, which may affect the species being fished. This includes the effects of weather and climate, and the interactions of target fish stocks with predators, competitors, and prey species.” Emphasis in original text, for details, sees: http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fm-gp/peches-fisheries/fish-ren-peche/sff-cpd/ecosys-back-fiche-eng.htm; (accessed 14 March 2014).

  2. 2.

    These sectoral comparisons are going to be undertaken within the framework of another project.

  3. 3.

    See for example Bernstein (2009), Bernstein and Pauly (2007), Falkner (2013), Hochstetler and Viola (2012), Jentoft (2007), Jessel (2010), Krahmann (2007, 2011), Ørebech (2013).

  4. 4.

    That “(A)ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial or political independence of any state; or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” And, that “(N)othing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” See: UN Charter Articles 2(4) and 2(7), respectively, at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (accessed 14 March 2014).

  5. 5.

    For details, see the ICISS report titled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (2001); see: http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage (accessed on 14 March 2014); see also, for many contributions on the emergence and standing of this norm Sands (2006) and Gholiagha (2014, forthcoming).

  6. 6.

    For discussions about the decline of multilateralism as an indicator of contested top-down norm implementation vis-à-vis new forms of coordinated multilateralism that indicate new practices of bottom-up strategies of compliance, I am indebted to Kathryn Hochstetler. I benefited hugely from her expertise on global governance during our “Schanzen Conversations” when she was a Visiting Professor at the German Institute for Global Area Studies in Hamburg throughout November 2013.

  7. 7.

    The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change took place in New York in 1992, for further information see the Report on the Workshop of Equitable Access to Sustainable Development of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, published by the UN, New York, Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2012, see also: https://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php, (accessed 14 March 2014).

  8. 8.

    The BASICs include the four large developing countries of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, which formed by an agreement on 28 November 2009.

  9. 9.

    For the concept of “fisheries governance” within the United Nations institutional setting, compare the website of the Fisheries and Aquaculture Department of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/2014/en; (accessed 14 March 2014).

  10. 10.

    The ‘turbot war’ lasted from 9 March to 16 April 1995, involving Canada, the UK and the EU. For references to the ‘turbot war’ see, for example, Howe and Kerby (2009), Joyner and Alvarez (1996), see also Cornago (2010).

  11. 11.

    For details on the Grand Bank fisheries, see: http://britishseafishing.co.uk/the-collapse-of-the-grand-banks-cod-fishery/ (accessed 14 March 2014).

  12. 12.

    See: http://www.humanities360.com/index.php/brian-tobin-and-the-turbot-war-of-1995-19910/ on p. 1 (accessed: 19 March 2014).

  13. 13.

    For the source of this report, see: http://britishseafishing.co.uk/the-turbot-war/ (accessed 14 March 2014). (Emphasis added AW).

  14. 14.

    As Tobin claimed in the Canadian House of Commons: “(T)he net had a 115 mm mesh, which is smaller than the 130 mm required by NAFO. In addition, the net in question had an 80 mm liner in the net. (Commons Debates, 15 March 1995, p. 10511)” (cited in Matthews 1996, p. 514).

  15. 15.

    As an intergovernmental fisheries science and management body, “NAFO was founded in 1979 as a successor to International Commission of the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) (1949–1978). NAFO's overall objective is to contribute through consultation and cooperation to the optimum utilization, rational management and conservation of the fishery resources of the NAFO Convention Area. The NAFO Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries applies to most fishery resources of the Northwest Atlantic except salmon, tunas/marlins, whales, and sedentary species (e.g. shellfish). Currently NAFO has 12 Members from North America, Europe, Asia and the Caribbean. Among them are four coastal states bordering the Convention Area: USA, Canada, France (in respect of St. Pierre et Miquelon), and Denmark (in respect of Faroe Islands and Greenland).” For details see: http://www.nafo.int (accessed 14 March 2014).

  16. 16.

    According to Matthews, the Canadian action was justified with reference “to moral rather than legal terms” (Matthews 1996, p. 505).

  17. 17.

    For detailed notes regarding the outcome, see: House of Commons, Hansard Debates, 18 April 1995, Column 20; emphasis added AW; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199495/cmhansrd/1995-04-18/Debate-1.html (accessed: 19 March 2014).

  18. 18.

    Compare, for example, the case of cod fisheries in Russia and Norway, or the case of cod fisheries in the North Sea and in the Baltic Sea, see Jessel (2010), pp. 73–85. For further information about the Russian–Norwegian Maritime Boundary Dispute, see: FISHEU—Contested Norms of Fisheries Governance, research project, directed by Prof. Dr. Antje Wiener and Dr. Antje Vetterlein, founded in 2010 at the University of Hamburg, details at: http://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/professuren/global-governance/forschung/kuerzlich-fertiggestellte-projekte/fisheu (accessed 14 March 2014); see also Hønneland (2011).

  19. 19.

    Compare Forman and Mackie (2013), Kratochwil (2014), Ostrom (1990), Rawls (2002), Sen (2009) Slaughter (2005), Ruggie (2005).

  20. 20.

    While this book has worked with a human-centric concept of contestation throughout, i.e. assuming that the right of access to regular contestation be claimed and put into practice by human beings, there are other concepts of actorship such as, for example, ecosystems as well as ‘Gaia’, who also hold legitimate claims to stakeholdership. I thank Jim Tully for this observation. While it brings the “Gaia hypothesis” to the fore, (Tully 1995), the argument leading beyond human-centric contestation is particularly important in the fields of ecology, earth science and climate science. Space limitations do not allow for an in-depth discussion of this argument in this book, however.

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Wiener, A. (2014). Applying the Theory of Contestation: Three Sectors of Global Governance. In: A Theory of Contestation. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-55235-9_6

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