Push and Pull of Judicial Demand and Supply

Abstract

This chapter analyses a dramatic increase in legal action in the Netherlands, a country long considered as a paradigm of low litigation propensity. It relates this evidence to sociological changes affecting judicial supply and demand for law. Supply push and demand pull may have reinforced each other. A microanalysis of problem solving strategies of households with different “legal needs” in Dutch-British comparison explains in part the change on the demand side. Available comparative surveys of the density, quality and costs of judicial systems and their budgets across the common law/civil law divide offer some clues on the supply side. Although more in-depth analysis and additional indicators are called for, one conclusion is clear: judicial systems work at highly diverse levels of cost and quality in the civil law world as well in the common law world.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Budgets Per Capita of the Justice System Including Prisons

Euro per capita	Norway (2004)	Netherlands (2004)	Germany (2004)	England and Wales (2004)	Canada (2000)	USA (2000)	Japan (2002)
Judicial expenditure	35	47	86	8	21	80	40
Legal aid (gross) expenditure	30	24	6	58	±10	Incl. public defense 13	8 Jap. Bar bengoshi
Prosecution	1.4a + Crown service est. ±25	9 Incl. criminal police est. ±20	±10	14.5	6		?
Prison expenditure (2000)	2006: 50	54	28	51	44	151	?
Total	115	133	127	141	81	244	48
Share of GDP (%)	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.2

1. Sources: Overseas own research/CEPEJ (2002, 2004)
2. Notes: Judicial expenditure exclusive of legal aid. The European study claims to rely on gross judicial budget data, but some doubts may be raised as to the distinction between gross and net costs in comparative data sets
3. This comparison omits labor courts in Germany as well as all costs which are not part of the national/state budgets of justice such as local (magistrate) courts in UK. Prison operating costs in ECU, Values as of Oct. 1999 USA civil legal aid not in the budgets (±1$ per cap.), public defense is part of prosecution budget. Japan’s Justice budget on the internet, legal aid not in judicial budget, bengoshi (lawyers) pay for it. Canada and US data taken from Ministry of Justice Den Haag 2000
4. Bold values signify judicial expenditure, legal aid (gross expenditure), prison expenditure and total expenditure
5. ^aNorway official prosecution costs (acc. to CEPEJ) do not include personnel, as prosecution resorts under the Crown. Including criminal investigators, high personnel rate (cf. Table  11.5 ). Altogether, our own cost estimate amounts to ±25. Analogue NL ± 20 (official data)/Norway prison costs according to 2006 budget

Appendix 2: Parties Seeking Justice

Stage of the procedure	Models of regulation	Who pays?—parties behind parties
Pre-court legal advice Representation in court Court fees	Hourly fees Fee scheme: by action       by value at stake Contingency fees Each party for themselves Loser pays all Court decision: split costs	Plaintiff investment Defendant investment Legal cost insurance Membership (trade unions, Automobile clubs) Legal aid Liability insurance Collective interest (consumer, environment associations)

Issue at stake	Frequent constellations
Civil: debt enforcement	Plaintiff investment, defendant loser pays costs
Consumer complaint	Plaintiff investment, settlement, costs are split
Liability	Plaintiff investment covered, by insurance/contingency fee defendant insured, split of costs
Traffic tort	Both sides insurance covered
Divorce	Parties pay, split of costs Woman plaintiff, legal aid covered
Labor dismissal	Plaintiff insurance covered/legal aid settlement, split of costs
Administrative complaint	Plaintiff investment, loser pays (1/3 of losers public administration)

1. Source: Author’s own diagram