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Abstract

Commercial laws, such as the takeover law, used to be considered as technical and easy to be transplanted. This book however shows significant divergence existing in the transplanted Chinese takeover law. It interprets and evaluates the divergence with references to the local regulatory needs, shareholding structure, and other context and makes proposals for improvement.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37(1) The Modern Law Review 1, 13.

  2. 2.

    Chapter 5, Sect. 5.9.4.

  3. 3.

    Section 4.4 ‘Separate Review Tracks for Corporate Reorganization’.

  4. 4.

    Wolfgang Wiegand, ‘The Reception of American Law in Europe’(1991) 39(2) The American Journal of Comparative Law 229, 230–246; J. H. Merryman, ‘Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Development Movement’ (1977) 25 American Journal of Comparative Law 457, 467–469.

  5. 5.

    Claude Levi Strauss, The Savage Mind (Nature of Human Society Series) (University of Chicago Press, 1966), 17.

  6. 6.

    张新 [Xin Zhang], ‘上市公司收购的立法和监管—我们为什么不能采取美国模式? [Takeover and Legislative Regulation: Why the American Approach is Disfavored]’ (2003) 8 证券市场导报 [Securities Market Herald] 1.

  7. 7.

    Ibid., 12–13.

  8. 8.

    One example is the controlling shareholders’ obligations in negotiated takeover transactions. See text surrounding note 98, Chap. 6.

  9. 9.

    More details can be viewed in Chap. 4, Sect. 4.4.

  10. 10.

    See Chap. 4, Sect. 4.7.

  11. 11.

    See text surrounding Chap. 5, Sect. 5.5.

  12. 12.

    See text surrounding Chap. 6, Sect. 6.6.

  13. 13.

    See text Chap. 7, Sect. 7.5.

  14. 14.

    Rafael La Porta et al., ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106(6) Journal of political Economy 1113.

  15. 15.

    See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.3.

  16. 16.

    See Chap. 6, Sect. 6.6.

  17. 17.

    See conclusion, Chap. 4.

  18. 18.

    These three approaches are discussed in Sect. 8.5 of this chapter.

  19. 19.

    See Chap. 3, Fig. 3.1.

  20. 20.

    See Chap. 3, Sect. 3.6.

  21. 21.

    See text surrounding note 6.

  22. 22.

    One example is the empirical study of takeover defences used in China’s practice. See text surrounding note 70, Chap. 7.

  23. 23.

    Discussed in Chap. 3, Sect. 3.5.

  24. 24.

    Note 6.

  25. 25.

    晏婴 [Ying Yan], ‘内篇杂下 [Part One Miscellaneous]’ in 晏子春秋 [Yan Zi Chunqiu] (李万寿 [Wanshou Li] Interpreter, 台湾古籍出版社 1996).

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Chen, J. (2014). Conclusion. In: Regulating the Takeover of Chinese Listed Companies. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54508-5_8

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